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 The  paper1 discusses four IMF-supported adjustment programs of Poland, 1990-
1995, and two of Russia, 1992-1994, in terms of the underlying theory, policy objectives, 
assumptions, policies, errors and results.  The paper suggests that the roles of the IMF 
and the World Bank have been helpful but, compared to the influence of domestic factors 
and local refomers, relatively modest. Transition-related features of the programs are the 
focus of the analysis. The specific topics include the choice of nominal anchors, the 
speed of disinflation, the choice of performance criteria, and the role of foreign economic 
assistance. 
                                              
1 Presented at the Conference on the Role of International Financial Institutions in Eastern Europe, 
Munich, April 12-14, 1994.  The paper benefitted much from criticisms by the conference discussants, 
Lothar Altman, Wolfgang Quaisser and Ben Slay, as well as from the extensive and helpful comments by 
Leszek Balcerowicz, Peter Boone, Josef Brada, Marek Dabrowski, Stefan Kawalec, Richard Portes, 
Markus Rodlauer, and Mark Schaffer.  Many drafts of this paper have been word-processed patiently and 
skilfully by Pat Nutt and Nadine Moles. Forthcoming: Journal  of Comparative Economics, June 1995 
The author has been Economic Adviser to Poland’s successive Finance Ministers since September 1989, 
under a Know-How Fund contract.  As a member of the Balcerowicz Group he advised the Polish 
Government on the design and implementation of the 1990-91 reform. He participated as an official in 
nearly all negotiations with the IMF, the World Bank and Poland’s Central Bank concerning 
macroeconomic and other policies for Poland, 1989-1994.  In 1990-91, he was a member of the Polish 
delegation negotiating the debt reduction with the Paris and London Clubs.  In late 1991 he also advised 
the Russian government on the liberalisation and stabilisation policies for 1992. 
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  The primary objective of this paper is to discuss the IMF-supported adjustment 
programs of Poland and Russia in terms of the underlying theory, policy objectives, 
explicit and implicit assumptions, proposed policies, major errors in assumptions and 
policies, and actual results.  Throughout this discussion, the intention is to identify the 
influence of systemic features and transition circumstances.  The analysis suggests that 
the roles of the IMF and the World Bank have been helpful but, compared to the 
influence of domestic factors and local reforms, relatively modest.   
  Part I of the paper provides a discussion of the broad policy objectives, common 
and separate, of the authorities of Poland, Russia and the two Bretton Woods Institutions, 
the IMF and the World Bank.  Part II outlines the theory underlying the standard IMF 
adjustment programs.  Part III collects and discusses what according to this author have 
been the major errors in assumptions and policies.  The aim is to identify the origins and 
the implications of those errors.  Part IV provides an analysis of the actual adjustment 
programs.  The major feature of this analysis is the discussion of aims and results of the 
various programs.  Finally, Part V addresses the issue of the role of foreign financial 
assistance in transition economies. The IMF-Supported Programs... 
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I.  Broad policy objectives 
  The main economic actors whose policy objectives I consider in this paper are the 
local reformers in Poland and Russia, the IMF and the World Bank.  The local reformers 
include above all successive finance ministers and presidents of Central Banks who are 
the main negotiating partners for the two Bretton Woods Institutions (BWIs) and, often, 
actual policy makers.  They and their aids and advisors are also the key policy designers.  
The governments, in Russia including the President, and parliaments are the key 
institutional partners and formal policy makers.  The immediate analytical problem, 
especially evident with respect to Russia,  is the wide variation in views among reformers 
at any time and the considerable changes in their views over time.  Some changes of 
objectives have also occurred on the part of the IMF and the World Bank.  Nevertheless, 
at a very broad level, both local reformers and these two institutions have important 
policy objectives that have been common and stable.   In terms of specific issues,  there 
have also been distinct differences in objectives between the IMF and the World Bank, 
and between these two institutions and the local reformers.  Because I wish to comment 
on reform programs in terms of success and failure, and such an evaluation depends 
critically on the objectives of the program designers, the nature of these objectives is 
important. 
1.  Differences in policy objectives. 
  At the level of broad and long-term objectives, the approaches of local reformers 
and the Bretton Woods Institutions have been similar.  These are expressed well by the 
first Polish Letter of Intent: "the sustained growth of output and living standards and the 
strengthening of our external position over the medium term...are the ultimate goals of 
our efforts" (LOI, covering letter, December 22 1989, p.1).  The proposed strategy to 
achieve these goals had the familiar three, and also generally accepted, components: 
extensive and rapid liberalization of prices and trade, macroeconomic discipline, and 
market-oriented structural and institutional reforms, particularly privatization.  Safety 
nets and external assistance were additional, supportive features.  Most reformers, 
especially in Poland but probably also in Russia, would even agree with the IMF that "it 
has taken us far too long to shake off two dangerous misconceptions of the 1970s: first, 
that monetary stability and growth are at odds with one another; and second, that 
external financing - borrowing - is the best path to growth" (Camdessus, July 11, 1990).  
To meet popular criticisms, the Director of the IMF also explained that "we are striving 
to improve the design of our programmes to ensure a better blend of adjustment, growth 
and equity,... we encourage governments to avoid raising taxes on the basic staples...and 
to protect critical social expenditures" (p.4). 
  However, the traditional, central concern of the IMF has been neither economic 
growth as such nor equity but macroeconomic stability in the short and medium term. Its 
main role is that of the major global regulator of economic policy, acting on behalf of the 
common interests of all member states, particularly of the G-7 group, to assist in Stanisław Gomułka 
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maintaining a proper international economic order.  Its services are called upon when that 
order is endangered, and Fund programs are designed specifically to assist in removing 
danger and restoring order.  Hence, the core policy concerns of such programs are the 
restoration and sustainability related to external and internal macroeconomic equilibria.  
The policy objectives and the performance criteria are related to these concerns.  The 
recipients of the IMF funds are typically Central Banks, not governments or enterprises, 
because the primary purpose of such loans is to strengthen the external position during 
the adjustment period. 
  While the IMF is concerned mainly with creating the right macroeconomic 
conditions for growth, the World Bank is a development agency concerned with the 
promotion and financing of economic growth itself.  To fulfil this role, the World Bank 
aims to create the right economy-wide microeconomic conditions for growth, largely by 
promoting price and trade liberalization, removal of subsidies and excessive import 
tariffs, market competition and privatization. 
  The coordination of policies for transition economies between the two sister 
organisations became, however, somewhat of a problem.  For institutional and other 
structural reforms are the core of the transformation, and they are neither macro nor 
microeconomic.  In principle, these reforms were supposed to be the province of the 
World Bank, but the immediate problems in Poland, 1989-90, and in Russia, 1992-94, 
were those of stabilization.  This initial primacy of macroeconomic issues gave the IMF 
the leading role in formulating conditions for all Western assistance, including that of the 
World Bank.  The policy interest of the IMF has consequently over time expanded to 
cover also all economy-wide market-oriented structural reforms.  Except on the occasion 
of negotiating so-called Structural Adjustment Loan in Poland, in Spring 1990, the role 
of the World Bank has been reduced to discussing sectoral adjustments and specific, 
government-supported investment projects.   
  Since September 1989, the Polish authorities have taken the view that the two 
institutions’ long-term objectives coincide with the ultimate interests of Polish reforms so 
much that the success of those reforms could become for them an important policy 
objective in itself2.   A special problem for Poland was a large foreign debt.  A very 
important and distinctive aim of the Polish reformers was therefore to enlist the 
international authority of the BWIs in supporting the case for a deep reduction of 
Poland’s foreign debt, which was seen as a pre-condition of long-term external viability 
and growth.  The eventual reduction of Poland’s debt by about US$20 billion has been by 
far the dominant form of external financial assistance.  The intermediary role of the 
BWIs, especially of the IMF, in obtaining the reduction has been significant.  
                                              
2 As in other countries, also in Poland and Russia there were of course policy markers and legislators 
deeply suspicious of the BWIs "true intentions".  The IMF-Supported Programs... 
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  The first common objective of the governments of Poland and Russia was to  gain 
IMF’s support in order to obtain international credibility for their proposed reforms.  The 
second common objective was that of the central reform group, based largely in the 
Finance Ministry and the Central Bank.  It was to enlist the professional authority of the 
BWIs in supporting its policies within the government, above all, and to some extent also 
in the parliament and the country in general, in order to obtain internal credibility for the 
reforms.   For this purpose, it was useful for the group to stress, even exaggerate, for 
domestic audiences the importance of external assistance and the influence of the BWIs 
among Western governments, banks and private investors.  The third common objective 
was to secure new credits.  Finally, the missions of the BWIs represented international 
think tanks of highly professional experts who have been providing Polish and Russian 
reformers with systematic analysis of the two economies, helping them to identify major 
economic problems and to formulate specific policy responses.  The fourth common 
objective was therefore to secure and benefit from the BWI’s, particularly the IMF’s, 
know-how 
  2.  Policy arguments and controversies 
  Policy controversies in Poland between the BWIs and reformers concerned 
important issues, such as energy pricing, the role of expectations in formulating the 
exchange rate policy in 1990 (see footnote 9), the level of interest rates in early 1990, the 
methods of financial restructuring of banks and enterprises in 1991/92 (Kawalec et al, 
1994b), the form of wage policy in 1990, the choice of nominal anchors in 1991-1993 
(see section 2 in part II), the speed of state-led commercialization and privatization, in 
particular the mass corporatization programme in 1990-91 and the mass privatization 
program in 1990-94, the ideal level of subsidies and the level of tariff protection.   
However, most of  the disagreements were either relatively minor or on relatively minor 
issues, and usually  resolved by the BWIs accepting the Polish view3.  Of overriding 
importance has been the agreement, initially much stronger in Poland than in Russia, that 
quick policy actions are required to liberalize prices and foreign trade, to impose a 
restrictive macroeconomic policy to discipline enterprises and stabilize liberalized prices, 
and to establish a process for fast privatization.  Following the Polish experience, the 
common ground in Russia also included the acceptance of the view that a large fall of 
output might be an unavoidable consequence of the accumulation of inherited structural 
problems and a necessarily rapid pace of system transformation following the sudden 
collapse of the old political system. 
                                              
3 The IMF’s technical expertise was still important in providing a critical consistency analysis of the 
Polish programs, particularly the stabilization program for 1990.  The macroeconomic assumptions 
underlying the state budgets, the budgets themselves and the policies to implement the programmes were, 
with few exceptions, of Polish origin.  Therefore the credit and blame for the results of the programmes 
should go largely to Polish reformers, rather than the Fund experts.  By and large the same applies with 
respect to Russia. Stanisław Gomułka 
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  Perhaps the most controversial issue has been the initially large weight accorded 
by the IMF to a very rapid reduction of the inflation rate during transition.  The IMF’s 
view on that matter has been changing somewhat, but the initial position was that low 
inflation, while not sufficient, is nearly necessary to effect a transformation to a market 
economy successfully. A low-inflation environment was taken by the IMF to be a 
monthly inflation rate of less than 1%.  It was deemed essential that this rate be achieved 
already within one year of the stabilization effort.  This particular policy aim was adopted 
by Poland for the end of 1990, and later for 1991. This initial view is the main reason 
why, despite large progress with liberalisation and privatisation reforms in Russia, the 
IMF was most reluctant to support the reforms financially in 1992-93.  With hindsight, it 
is fairly clear that inflation need not be low for a system transformation to be successful. 
  The IMF is an institutional guardian of low inflation, and its credibility worldwide 
depends on how well that role is discharged. It may have therefore developed an 
institutional bias in attributing to high inflation excessive resource costs and in refusing 
to accept that, in conditions of extraordinary output falls, which is a specifically 
transitional feature,  welfare benefits arising from income redistribution, among both 
households and enterprises, from rich to poor through the inflation tax may be sizeable 
and socially important.   But it is an exageration to maintain, as Portes (1994b) does, that 
"The main trap...was in the over-emphasis on macroeconomic policy itself."  Portes goes 
on to argue that it was wrong for the non- Fund agencies, e.g. G7, G24, EC and the 
World Bank, to make aid "conditional on agreement to a stabilization programme with 
the Fund and thereby to put its priorities at the top of policy-makers' agendas" (p.1184).  
Even if one accepts this assessment, as I am inclined to do with reference to the IMF 
advice for Poland in the years 1989- 91, macroeconomic stabilisation is still an important 
aim to achieve fairly quickly.  The destructive impact of high inflation is particularly 
high when inflation is caused by large subsidised credits to enterprises. A loose 
macroeconomic policy interferes then with needed structural adjustment, which was the 
case of Russia in 1992-944. 
  Still, in transition economies relative prices need to undergo exceptionally large 
changes, and these are easier to accommodate when inflation rate is fairly high or at least 
moderate for a while (Balcerowicz and Gelb, 1994).  There may, therefore, be a case, in 
transition economies, for a more gradual disinflation path than the one initially so 
strongly insisted on by the IMF, a path of the type or only somewhat steeper than the one 
actually followed by Poland: 3000% in 1989 (the last five months of the year, on an 
annual basis), 249% in 1990, 60% in 1991, 44% in 1992, 38% in 1993, 30% in 1994 and 
about 20% expected in 1995, (these are within-year changes of the consumer price 
index).  This view has recently been given support by several  economists (Bruno 1993, 
Dornbusch and Fischer 1993, and Layard 1994).  Initial proposals of instant stabilization 
                                              
4 When inflation is not fully anticipated, which may have been the case in Russia in 1992, subsidies to 
enterprises financed by central bank credit creation tend to raise real purchasing power and therefore help 
to sustain old output (Kierzkowski et al, 1994,p.33).  The IMF-Supported Programs... 
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of liberalized prices also overlooked that, in the course of transition, a serious budget 
deficit problem tends to develop for good, transition-related reasons: a smaller tax base as 
economic activity shrinks, initially inappropriate tax systems, poor tax administration and 
the growth of shadow economy.  In market-based economies, the cases of successful 
gradual disinflation from very high inflation rates have been rare, but Poland 1989 and 
Russia 1991-1994 did not belong to the category of truly hiperinflation cases.  The Polish 
and Russian experience suggests that the reasonable aim of the stabilisation policy should 
be to ensure that the annual inflation rate falls to some 20 to 40% in the medium term, 
during a period of falling output, and to below 10% during the recovery period.  In 1994, 
Poland adopted the latter objective for 1997, primarily in order to reduce interest rates 
and to stimulate investments, but also to facilitate negotiations concerning the joining of 
the European Communities.  The actual joining of the Communities will require a further 
reduction of inflation in Poland, probably to  below or about 3% per year. 
II.  The conceptualization of policies and performance 
 criteria 
  The standard IMF program has five interconnected components: fiscal, monetary, 
external balance, incomes, and structural and institutional changes. It sets principal policy 
aims and formulates policies in all these five components to achieve its aims.  Given 
initial conditions and some behavioral and other assumptions, it also formulates 
performance criteria for the purpose of monitoring the programs’ implementation. 
  1.  The macroeconomic consistency conditions. 
  Using standard notation, a demand-driven macroeconomic model may be written 
in the form of the following ten equations: 
  Y   =   C ( Y d,M/p) + I(Π/p,r) +G+X(pq) -pqQ(pq,Y)   (1) 
where pq = ep*/p, the ratio of foreign to domestic prices,e is the exchange rate,  r is the 
interest rate, Π is profits, Yd is disposable income, X is exports and Q is imports, all in 
real terms; 
  Y d = Yd  (Y,T/p,r)        (2) 
    T = T (pY,Π, tax rates) - transfers         (3) 
  Π  =  pY  -  wL(Y)        (4) 
  M d = V(r,ie)   p Y         ( 5 )  
  M s = eR + ∫(pG-T)dt  +  K(r)     (6) Stanisław Gomułka 
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where T is net government revenue, R is the stock of net international reserves,  K is the 
stock of bank credit to the non-financial sector of the economy, and ie is the expected 
inflation rate; 
  M d = Ms         ( 7 )  
  X   -   p q Q + NCF = ∆R        ( 8 )  
  p  =  p(w,e,r)         (9) 
  w  =  w(p-1,pe,u,...), or pMPL = w, or w = w    ‘  (10) 
where NCF is the net capital flow, pe is the expected price level, u is the unemployment 
rate, and MPL is the marginal product of labour. 
  The ten endogenous variables in this model are: Y, Yd, Π, T, Md, Ms, p, w, r and 
either e, under the floating exchange-rate regime, or R if the exchange rate is 
exogenously fixed. In the system above, the variables influenced strongly by 
expectations, pe and ie, are regarded as given parameters.  
  In the terms of our four macro components of the program, the relevant variables 
are:  
fiscal:    the budget deficit, BD = pG-T,  
monetary:   r 
external:   e and R 
incomes:   w 
  The quantity of money is endogenously determined :  
  M = eR + ∫BDdt + K(r). 
  In order to stabilize quickly, the wage rate, w, is sometimes fixed or subjected to 
an incomes policy. In this case, under the fixed exchange regime, w and e are 
exogenously given, and all the other variables of the model are functions of the two 
variables.  In particular, given G, the rates w and e would determine the price level, as 
well as the interest rate, the budget deficit, NIR, net international reserves, the demand 
for credit, K, and money, M.   
2.  The question of nominal anchors.   
  The preferred IMF approach in 1989-1991 was to have both e and w serve as 
nominal anchors of a stabilization program, as was the case in Poland in 1990.  Therefore 
the IMF felt at a loss in Russia in late 1991 when neither of the two variables could serve The IMF-Supported Programs... 
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as an anchor.  Given the virtual non-existence of international reserves in Russia at the 
start of transition in 1992, a floating exchange rate policy was accepted by the IMF as 
inevitable and superior to a fixed exchange rate combined with rationing of the foreign 
exchange by central authorities. 
  The budget deficit outcome is conditional on meeting the revenue target, T, and 
choosing the level of government spending, G.  In transition economies, and especially in 
periods of high inflation, both taxes and government spending undergo large changes and 
they, rather than the exchange rate or the level of international reserves, are under direct 
government influence.  In such circumstances, the evolution of BD, of bank credit to 
enterprises and households, and possibly of w, decide the level of prices and the rate of 
inflation.  In this case, the policy instruments remaining under the formal control of the 
Central Bank, such as the money supply, the nominal exchange rate and the nominal 
interest rate, are decided to a large extent by developments outside Central Bank control.   
  The argument in favour of using a fixed nominal exchange rate as the policy 
instrument for bringing the rate of inflation down rests mainly on the proposition that 
once the authorities are publicly and strongly committed to the policy, they would judge 
it politically less costly to make the required adjustments - to fiscal policy, with an aim of 
reducing bank credit to the government, and/or to interest  rate policy, in order to reduce 
credit to enterpises and households - rather than to devalue the exchange rate. 
  It is safe to adopt policies based on this proposition only when reformers enjoy 
considerable freedom of action, as in Poland at the end of 1989 and the beginning of 
1990.  In most transition economies and for most of the time the political conditions are 
however volatile, and the freedom to act is limited.  This author therefore promoted the 
doctrine that exchange rate policy in Poland should be subordinated to the needs of 
securing and maintaining external equilibrium, while fiscal, monetary and incomes 
policies should address the inflation problem.  The implication of this separation 
principle has been that the real exchange rate should be set at a competitive level (though 
not excessively competitive) and be stable.  This has indeed been the policy in Poland 
since late 1991. (See also footnotes 5 and 9).  The stability of the real exchange rate was 
achieved through the very transparent instrument of daily devaluations at a pre-
announced rate linked to anticipated inflation, the exchange rate having been corrected 
further when necessary by additional small and infrequent devaluations linked to past 
inflation.  The policy has been adopted and maintained despite considerable and, given 
its primary responsibility for external equilibrium, somewhat unexpected misgivings by 
the IMF which wished it to play a more active role in reducing inflation. 
  Portes (1994b) notes that, with respect to the exchange rate policy, "the trap was 
not early convertibility or fixed nominal exchange rates where these were implemented, 
but rather over-devaluation" (p.1184).  However, a large upfront devaluation in Poland 
and other countries brought about important benefits that Portes and other critics of the 
exchange rate policy actually adopted tend to overlook or undervalue: it protected 
domestic producers from excessive imports in the vital initial stage of transformation, and Stanisław Gomułka 
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it stimulated exports at a time when domestic demand fell sharply and international 
reserves were low.  A significant over-devaluation does have a major drawback in that it 
opens up a gap between world prices and domestic prices for tradeables. The 
consequence is that external competition can not help arrest a rapid increase in domestic 
prices in the period following devaluation, despite the fact that the nominal exchange rate 
remains constant (Williamson 1991, Gomułka 1993).  For the exchange rate to be a truly 
effective nominal anchor, the magnitude of its undervaluation should not be excessive. If 
it is, there is either no solid anchor in place or that role is played by the money supply. In 
Poland, the money supply was a solid anchor only in the first quarter of 1990, while the 
exchange rate played the role of anchoring the price structure strongly only in early 1991.  
From that perspective, the upfront devaluation in Poland, and even more so in 
Czechoslovakia and the former Soviet Union, were clearly excessive.  However, the 
anchoring role is, in the initial phase of transition, less important than the benefits of a 
low real exchange rate mentioned earlier  (see also footnote 5).  
   Portes also states that "there was insufficient clarity regarding the exchange-rate 
regime". In fact, it was assumed already in the Autumn of 1989, though not stated in 
official documents, that a form of crawl may have to, and probably would, follow the peg 
once the real exchange rate appreciated to an appropriate long-run level. 
  When the central authorities set the interest rate at a level too low to bring the 
market for credit into equilibrium, which is often the case in transition economies, credit 
to enterprises is subject to an administrative limit imposed by the Central Bank. In this 
case, this credit limit, in addition to direct or indirect Central Bank financing of the 
budget deficit, is the second main nominal variable influencing prices, in this sense a sort 
of nominal anchor.  This has been the case in Poland 1990-1991 and Russia throughout 
1992-1994, where both anchors were however highly flexible. 
3.  Hazards in the choice of macroeconomic and other assumptions. 
  The starting point for a macroeconomic program designer is usually the price path, 
specified in terms of the monthly inflation rate, in the course of the period covered by the 
Fund-supported program.  Achieving the targeted price path is typically a principal short-
term policy aim of the program.  If it is a stabilization program, that price path would 
show a strong disinflation.  Already at this stage of program design, the problem is to 
estimate correctly the unavoidable cost-push impact on prices of intended policy actions.  
This impact is largest at the start of transition and, as I discussed earlier, this is also the 
time when the choice of the disinflation path represents the greatest hazard. 
  The second major step in designing a program involves the use of the Fisher 
equation to determine the quarterly changes in the quantity of money that are consistent 
with the targeted price path, equation 5 above.  At this stage, assumptions have to be 
made about the level of real GDP and the velocity of money circulation. Again, in a 
period of systemic transformation, the risks are that the assumptions adopted are 
seriously wrong, as in Poland 1990 and in 1991, and in Russia in 1992.     The IMF-Supported Programs... 
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  The third step is to divide the available money increase between credit to the 
government, credit to the non-financial sector of the economy and a change of the NIR, 
equation 6.  The money increase thus represents a budget constraint. In order to decide 
about the uses of new money, it is essential to know the size of the budget deficit that 
would have occurred under existing legislation, the likely net inflow of foreign capital, 
and the size of the so-called directed credit to economic units. During systemic 
transformation, major revenue and expenditure reforms take place, the level of economic 
activity changes rapidly and fiscal discipline is difficult to maintain. Assumptions 
underlying the government budget are consequently often wrong by wide margins, as in 
Poland in 1990-1991 and in Russia in 1992-1994.  
  The fourth step is the consideration of detailed policy measures that appear to be 
needed to bridge the gaps between the targets implied by the three-way division made at 
the third stage of the permissible money increase and the likely outcomes in the absence 
of such measures. By the nature of things, these measures are concentrated on public 
finances. 
  To achieve consistency, the analytical framework cannot be linear, a sequence of 
steps as outlined above, but must be one of a general equilibrium type.  In particular, the 
original assumption concerning the targeted inflation path may be altered in view of the 
necessary policy measures implied by the analysis at stage four, and this may lead to the 
next round of program design. 
4.  The inherent tension between strict quantitative criteria and 
loose   quantitative analysis. 
  The choice of performance criteria by the BWIs reflects the strongly 
macroeconomic and short-term orientation of the IMF and the microeconomic and 
medium-term orientation of the World Bank. The IMF criteria are typically few, 
quantitative and quarterly.  The interesting feature of these programs is that the inflation 
rate is a policy objective rather than a binding target. This is in recognition of the fact that 
policy makers do not control inflation directly, and their indirect control is imprecise 
(IMF, 1988,p.16).  The key criteria are as follows: 
(a)  The upper limit for the cumulative change in net credit of the banking system to 
  the general government; 
(b)  The upper limit for the cumulative deficit of the general government; 
(c)  The upper limit for the cumulative change in the net domestic assets of the 
  banking system; and 
(d)  The lower limit for the cumulative change in NIR in convertible currencies of the 
 banking  system. Stanisław Gomułka 
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  There may also be a limit for changes in average wages or wage funds in the 
socialized sector, and a limit on contracting or guaranteeing of new external debt. 
  These criteria are not different in conception from those of the standard IMF 
program; they are, in fact, the same. This underscores my earlier point that, despite 
substanital interest in and intensive policy discussions about systemic transformation 
reforms, the inflation rate and the external position, and not these reforms as such, remain 
effectively the central focus of IMF programs for transition economies. The only 
significant concession for transition concerns the quality of programs as reflected in the 
lesser tightness of criteria. Of the three types of programmes; the Extended Fund Facility, 
the Stand-by Agreement and the Systemic Transformation Facility, the first is the most 
demanding and the last the least demanding. Fund programmes for economies in 
transition are usually of the latter two categories.  The credibility of the IMF requires that 
it treats the agreed quantitative targets seriously. While waivers may be granted, the 
programs are usually suspended if limits are breached by significant margins. 
III.  Major errors in assumptions and policies. 
  Part IV of the paper discusses actual programs and their outcomes.  However, it 
will be useful to collect and discuss briefly in this section the major errors in assumptions 
and policies.  It will be evident that these errors are related mainly to the exceptional 
complexity of the transformation process, the influence on economic policies of difficult 
to predit political developments, the presence of large uncertaintities, and limited 
experience of the program designers at the start of the process.  In these circumstances 
the forecasting errors were virtually inveitable, and these in turn influenced policies.  
Some errors (4, 7 and 9 listed below) were however of policy design and implementation.  
Despite those errors, the Polish stand-by program for 1990 was successful on its own 
terms,  but errors contributed to the failure of the Fund-supported program for Poland in 
1991and for Russia in 1992/93. The third Polish program, for 1993, was almost error-free 
and exceptionally successful.  An important difference between Poland and Russia was 
that Polish programmes were negotiated by the authorities, with the political will to 
implement them.  Most programs for Russia, especially in the years 1992-1993, were 
proposed and accepted by the Russian authorities without adequate commitment to 
implement them. 
  Poland 
Error 1.  Assumptions concerning GDP growth: 
    -3.5% in 1990 against actual -11.4% 
    +3.5% in 1991 against actual -7.4% The IMF-Supported Programs... 
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  The so called actual numbers above are, in fact, the official estimates of measured 
changes in GDP.  The actual GDP declines were significantly lower than officially stated 
(Zienkowski, 1992). Nevertheless, these forecasting errors were probably large, 
especially for 1991, when the size of the collapse of the CMEA and the impact of that 
collapse and of the dollarization of trade with the former CMEA area were grossly 
underestimated.  In the program for 1990, little attention was given to the other two 
phenomena that deepen the fall of output: de-stocking of inventories and high savings of 
households.  While these assumptions on GDP growth were made by the Polish Finance 
Ministry, they were accepted by the IMF. 
Error  2.  The assumptions concerning corrective inflation in the consumer price 
    index, following price corrections and price liberalization, compared to the 
    average prices of December 1989:  
    45% against actual 79.6% in January 1990  
    75% in Q1, 1990 against actual 133%. 
  The IMF team produced estimates, dated December 5, 1989, that predicted the 
following monthly inflation rates: 42.6% in January, 16.6% in February and 4.9% in 
March 1990.  This prediction formed the basis for the choice of the dis-inflation path in 
the course of 1990 and the choice of the exchange rate in the Polish stabilization program 
for 1990.  In view of the fact that both choices were very important and both have 
subsequently attracted strong criticism, it may be useful to give more details of the 
underlying analysis.  The estimates of the IMF team were based on the following 
assumptions:  
The Q1, 1990 price effect of excess liquidity to be 20%, the excess to be 
absorbed by coal and other energy price increases, 12% in January, 5.4% in 
February and 1.7% in March;  
The coal price increase would be 500% and gas increase 200% in January, and 
these were approximately the actual increases;  
The January wage increase would be equal to inflation minus the impact of 
exchange rate adjustment, wage levels would remain fixed in February-April, 
and then indexed on inflation of the same month with 70%; coefficient from 
May; this assumption was approximately correct, except for January when wage 
increase was much lower;  
The new exchange rate would be 9706 zloty to the dollar, the result of adding up 
the December unification level of 5888, export incentives due to be removed 
430, the effect of January inflation, 2505, and a 10% safety margin of 882 zloty; 
the actual rate chosen was 9500.   
  The wage increase was assumed to be 26.5% in January, but its contribution to 
inflation would be only 4.3%, and then 2.1% in February and 0.7% in March.   Stanisław Gomułka 
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  The cumulative Q1. 1990 price impact of devaluation was thought to be 24%, of 
which 14.4% in January, 6.3% in February and 2% in March.   
  At the request of the Polish authorities, I discussed these projections with the 
IMF’s team on December 6, 1989.  My notes show that I proposed corrections, including 
3 times higher impact of wage increases and 2 times higher impact of energy price 
increases, no impact of the stock excess demand, which I assumed to be already non 
existant, but an impact of the flow excess demand of 10% in January, which implied the 
following inflation rates: 70% in January, 30% in February and 10% in March.  The 
actual rates were: 79% in January, 24% in February and 4.7% in March.  My projection 
for Q1, 1990 was therefore close to the actual outcome, 143% against actual 133%.  The 
actual wage increases were lower than assumed by both sides in these discussions, while 
neither side took full account of the cost-push impact of sharp increases of interest rates 
and depreciation rates, as well as of the December 1989 devaluations.  It is quite clear 
that both sets of estimates were little more than educated guesses, but with a strong 
tendency for the IMF to come up with low estimates for corrective inflation.  
  The much lower IMF-projected inflation rates were seen by the Polish side as 
probably unrealistic, but they were accepted nevertheless as an built-in safety margin of 
the program.  The point was that some expenditures of the government budget and 
money supply targets of the NBP would have to be increased if the projected inflation 
rate were also increased.  The actual fiscal and monetary policies were consequently, in 
the first half of 1990, much tighter than in the program, and so helped to increase exports 
and achieve the targeted disinflation path, though probably at some cost in the form of 
reduced output (IMF 1990b, Gomulka 1991b)5.  
                                              
5 On December 7, 1989, the IMF team produced the so-called "Alternative 2" projection, in which the 
impact of price liberalisation, including energy price rises, was increased from 20% to 40% in Q1, 1990.  
The impact of wage rises was also increased somewhat.  In this scenario, prices would rise 53% in 
January, 21% in February and 6.6% in March, giving a total increase, in Q1, of 97%, and an exchange 
rate of 10,385 zl. to the US$.  That alternative was eventually dropped as ’too pessimistic’.  The Polish 
program was later often criticised for adopting an excessive devaluation of the zloty.  The Polish Ministry 
of Finance, on the strong advice of the Ministry for External Trade and with the support of the Central 
Bank, assumed initially that the new exchange rate would be 10,500 zl. and that it would be fixed until 
April 1990 and then progressively increased to 14,500 zl. by the end of 1990.  In a note to Leszek 
Balcerowicz, dated December 4 1989, Michael Bruno, at that time Governor of the Bank of Israel on a 
visit to Poland, suggested that there may be no need to devalue, or make only a small correction, at the 
launching of the stabilisation program.  The suggestion would imply a rate of about 6500-7000 zloty per 
US dollar.  The note influenced the correction of the Polish original intention and the choice of 9500 zl. 
as the rate, which happened to be also the IMF’s original suggestion: their alternative 1.  Bruno’s 
suggested rate would have been probably sustainable for much of 1990, and possibly be a superior choice, 
although the actual choice was in my view justified by the urgent need to increase international reserves 
and to provide a safety margin for the program.  In December 1989 about 2/3 of broad money was in the 
form of dollar deposits and the macroeconomic credibility of the authorities was poor. In these 
circumstances dollar reserves and safety margin were far more important considerations than the 
inflationary or even recessionary impact of a potentially excessive devaluation, the latter stressed much The IMF-Supported Programs... 
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Error 3.  The misinterpretation of the reasons for large taxable statistical profits in 
    1989 and 1990, the consequent large underestimation of holding gains 
    during that period, and a large over-estimation of taxable profits in 1991. 
  These matters are discussed best in Schaffer (1993). The presence of holding gains 
was known in principle, but the absence of good data on inventories prevented the 
Polish/IMF programme designers from coming up with a credible estimate of any gains 
and their impact on profits and budget revenue.  In the absence of such estimates, a 
popular hypothesis in 1990, later abandoned, was that very high profit margins, and 
sharper-than-assumed output falls, reflected the monopolized market structure6. 
Error 4.  The reforms of the pension system in 1990-91, which led to an explosion of 
    social transfers in 1991-1994.   
  It was overlooked that a backward-looking indexation rule, linking current 
changes in transfers to past changes in wages, would result in a sharp increase in the ratio 
of benefits to wages with the progress of stabilization.  Also, the criteria for early 
retirement and invalidity pensions are too liberal, and this resulted in a sharp increase of 
the number of pensioners (Gomułka 1993, Barbone 1994). 
  Errors 3 and 4 were large enough to set the stage for the fiscal crisis in 1991-92, 
the collapse of the EFF programme in the middle of 1991, and severe fiscal problems in 
1992-94. 
Error 5.  The targets for state-driven privatization were initially excessively  
  optimistic.     
  However, an explosive growth of the original private sector has largely neutralised 
the negative impact of that particular error on the assumed growth of the private sector 
(Rostowski 1993, Gomułka and Jasiński 1994). 
Error 6.  The Extended Fund Facility (EFF) program for 1991-93 assumed a hugely 
    optimistic growth rate of 15% per year for the level of investment activity.  
  In 1990 the perception was that the recovery in output would be led by investment 
and net exports (Gomułka 1990, Republic of Poland, 1991).  It was overlooked that, 
                                                                                                                                                  
but without evidence or estimates by several critics of the chosen exchange rate (Kolodko 1992, 
Lutkowski 1994, Portes 1994b, Rosati, 1993). For further discussion, see sections II2 and IV1. 
6 This view was particularly popular at the IMF as well as among the domestic critics of the government 
program.  According to Camdessus (1991), "The decision to free prices (at a stage in the reform process 
when large state enterprises had not yet been either privatised or split up into competitive units) may 
have allowed some state enterprises to exercise the monopoly power they already had."  This statement is 
probably correct, but Camdessus goes on to claim that "This may explain why prices rose more than 
expected in 1990, despite tight monetary policy", which appears to regard the monopolised market 
structure as the principal reason for the error. Stanisław Gomułka 
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following large falls of output and real incomes, recovery is likely to be consumption led.  
The Polish government programs for each year of the period 1991-93 continued to call 
for a redistribution of expenditure from private consumption to investment and net 
exports, but the actual developments had each year moved in the opposite direction.  This 
changed only in 1994, when the classical model of recovery and growth began to apply. 
Errors 7 & 8.  The exchange rate was kept fixed for several months longer than need be, 
    and import tariffs were increased in August 1991, instead at the beginning 
    of 1991, as initially planned. 
  These two policies may not have been errors in the long term, as they promoted 
competition and structural changes.  Nevertheless, in 1991, they must have accentuated 
the fall of output and contributed to the budget deficit. 
  Russia 
  Most errors in that country were of implementation rather than of design.  The 
Russian IMF team from late 1991 on included several experienced members of the earlier 
Polish IMF teams, but the IMF’s impact on policy implementation in Russia, especially in 
the years 1992-93, was clearly less substantial than in Poland.  This changed in late 1993 
and in 1994. 
Error 1.  An initial error of the Gaidar Plan was again a vast underestimation of 
    corrective inflation in January, 1992: assumed 100% against actual 245%.  
  
  The assumption was influenced by the advice of the IMF team, which itself was 
influenced by an analysis due to Mario Blejer (1991,p.5).  The analysis appeared careful, 
with many caveats, but it concluded that "the initial rise in the price level needed to 
restore stock balance to the money market should not exceed 70-75 per cent".  The IMF 
team suggested that the increase would be 50%.   An internal estimate by the Russian 
Economics Ministry, based on unit cost analysis, was of an increase by about 200%.  
This appeared vastly excessive and was rejected in a written directive to the Budget 
Group of the Finance Ministry by Gaidar himself.  The error was not fatal by any means, 
but it was large enough to undermine significantly the credibility of the first Gaidar 
budget for Q1, 1992. 
Error 2.  Initial support of the IMF for a common currency and a monetary union 
    spanning most of the FSU was a policy mistake that betrayed technocratic 
    bias and political naivete or insensitivity.   
  The proposal was intended to limit the inflation rate by providing " a set of rules 
for a coordinated monetory policy" (Hernandez-Cata,, 1994).  An additional outcome of 
the proposal, if adopted,  would have been a lower trade shock and a lower fall of output.  
However, the proposal could not be accepted by Russia without its Central Bank The IMF-Supported Programs... 
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controlling fully the credit expansion by the non-Russian members of the ruble zone, and 
such control would be at variance with the aspirations for independence of most of those 
members (Odling-Smee, 1992).  The prolonged existence of the ruble zone did probably 
limit the trade shock, but it also contributed to the budgetary problems of Russia7. 
Error 3.  As mentioned earlier, strong emphasis by the IMF, bordering on single-
    minded concern, was placed initially on inflation and marcoeconomic 
    policies, while little recognition in formal performance criteria as opposed 
    to policy interest, was given to the key transformation-related reforms on 
  liberalisation,  institutional change and privatization.  
  Even the major improvement in the external position of the country was not 
recognized early enough and properly.  The IMF’s 1993 Systemic Transformation 
Facility of US$4 billion was a financial innovation intended essentially to redress the 
imbalance8.      
IV.  Programs and Outcomes 
  This section discusses briefly six IMF-supported programs, four for Poland and 
two for Russia, with a view to identifying their distinct features and purposes. 
1.  The Polish stand-by program for 1990: a conditional success? 
  This extremely important program both for Poland and the IMF had a number of 
unusual features (Republic of Poland, 1989).  They were directly linked to the launching 
of a radical reform in crisis circumstances and the absence of any similar experiences by 
policy designers.  The main paradoxical feature of the program was that many of its 
important assumptions and policy aims were missed by wide margins, yet all of its six 
performance criteria were comfortably met during most of 1990, allowing Poland to draw 
three tranches of the total support granted out of the four available.  Compared to the 
initial assumptions, the output fall was much larger, yet the fiscal outturn of the general 
government, including extra-budgetary funds, was much better, resulting in a 3.1% GDP 
surplus instead of 0.6% GDP deficit; the surplus was particularly, and clearly 
                                              
7 On July 1, 1992 Russia discontinued the automatic extension of CBR credit to other central banks of the 
FSU.  This accelerated the introduction of separate currencies.  The CBR’s withdrawal of the pre-1993 
ruble notes in July 1993 and the elimination of subsidies by Russian Government to other republics in the 
second half of 1993 led to the end of the ruble area. 
8 In support of the G-7 proposal for an exceptional program of assistance to Russia, the World Bank has 
an Accelerated Program of lending also amounting  to US$ 4 billion.  The Bank’s Rehabilitation Loan of 
US$ 0.6 billion, approved in 1992, belongs to the same category. 
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excessively, large, about 8% of GDP, in the first half of 1990.  The exchange rate had 
held throughout the period, yet consumer prices increased by 250% rather than the 
assumed 94%; and despite the large appreciation of the zloty, the trade surplus was much 
higher than assumed.  All these developments have good ex-post explanations, but were 
wholly surprising for the program designers, both Polish and IMF.  Another surprise was 
that two major concerns of the designers proved to be misplaced.  These were the rules 
for indexing the wage norm in the first six months of the program, particularly in the first 
month, and whether a public and binding commitment could be made by the Polish 
authorities to defend the exchange rate at a fixed level for a specific period of time, e.g. 
three, six or a full twelve months9.  For the IMF, a satisfactory agreement about these two 
matters was seen as crucial for the success of the entire program.  Discussions of these 
issues, especially the exchange rate policy, were therefore both intense and time-
consuming.  In the event, the much tighter than planned actual fiscal and monetary 
policies, largely the automatic result of errors 2 and 3, and a deeper than expected fall of 
output, rendered the two issues irrelevant for the critical first half of 1990. 
  In retrospect, given the novelty of systemic circumstances and the initial crisis 
conditions, the program served its role with respect to transition policies of a clear and 
broadly consistent declaration of intentions remarkably well.  The built-in safeguards and 
errors of the program resulted in a stop-go sequence of policies that proved more 
pronounced than desirable, but this feature was secondary compared to large 
achievements (IMF 1991, Gomułka 1991, 1992, 1993a, Rosati 1993).  Some critics of the 
actual policies conducted in 1990, notably Kołodko (1993), stress excessive overshooting 
                                              
9 Under the terms of the incomes policy operating in 1990, most enterprises paid a large penalty if the 
average wage (or the total wage costs) exceeded the enterprise-specific wage norm.  The effectiveness of 
the policy in bringing inflation down depended crucially on the choice of the coefficient linking changes 
of wage norms to inflation.  The lower the coefficient, the lower would be the scope for compensating 
workers for past inflation, and therefore also a faster rate of dis-inflation.  Two broad options were 
considered by the government.  The initial option assumed the coefficient to be close to 1 in the first 
month of the stabilisation programme and 0.7 thereafter.  The subsequently preferred option assumed the 
coefficient to be close to 0.5 in the first month (0.3 was in fact chosen) and 0.2 in the next three months, 
followed by 0.6 thereafter.  The IMF was prepared to accept at most o.5 for the first few months of the 
programme. The Polish second proposal was therefore wholly acceptable to them and became part of the 
programme. 
Although the setting up of a $1 billion stabilisation fund by the G-24 was proposed already in September 
1989, both the Polish Government and the IMF were uncertain that it would actually be set up.  It was set 
up only at the end of January 1990 from contributions by 10 countries.  Nevertheless the IMF was 
insisting during the October-to-December 1989 negotiations very strongly that, in order to break 
inflationary expectations of the population, the exchange rate should be fixed for a period of at least 3 and 
possibly up to 12 months, and a public commitment to defend the rate should be made by the Polish 
authorities.  The Polish side argued that a mere public announcement by the government carries little 
weight in Poland, and that the fate of the exchange rate will be decided instead by the actual fiscal, 
monetary and incomes policies.  Despite large uncertainties, the intended policies seemed strong enough 
and the initial devaluation large enough for the Polish negotiators to accept, as a policy aim, the 
preservation of the fixed exchange rate for (at least) the first three months. The IMF-Supported Programs... 
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in the first half of 1990.  However, some overshooting should be an important feature of 
any good stabilization program.  Poland’s overshooting in the first few months of 1990 
was probably excessive.  This was recognised by the end of April 1990 when the reasons 
for a large overfulfilment of all the performance criteria for Q.1, 1990, were discussed by 
the Polish side (Balcerowicz and his top advisers) and the IMF.  A correction of the 
policies was subsequently made for the second half of 199010.  Industrial output in the 
2nd half of 1990 was about 15 per cent higher than in the 1st half, but a part of the 
increase was due to seasonal factors.  The claim of large welfare costs of the Polish first 
programme seems therefore wrong, especially in view of still larger output falls in the 
post communist countries that adopted a much more gradual approach in their 
macroeconomic policies (Hungary, most of the FSU). 
2.  The Polish EFF program for 1991-93: a failure that served a 
 purpose? 
  This three year program was meant to be a successful follow-up of the first 
standby (Republic of Poland, 1991).  However, errors 2, 3 and 4 discussed in Part I, 
section 3, led to its suspension only a few months after approval on April 18 199111.  
  In early 1991, the flaws of the program were already apparent, but there was not 
time to renegotiate it, because, on March 18, 1991, the Paris Club offered Poland an 
immediate 30% debt reduction, conditional only on her having a Fund-supported 
economic program.  The condition was met on April 18, 1991, and the reduction was 
granted on April 19, 1991.  The EFF therefore served an important purpose. 
3.  The Polish Stand-by for 1993: a model of success?   
  Errors 2, 3 and 4 mentioned above led not only to the suspension of the EFF 
program; they also produced a threat to the progress of stabilization in the form of a large 
budget deficit.  Despite corrective measures, the deficit of the general government 
reached 6% of GDP in 1991 and 7% in 1992 (Table 4).  The deficits were financed to a 
large extent by monetary expansion and, by 1992, became the main source of inflation.  
In the meantime, the Paris Club accepted that Poland would qualify for a further 20% 
                                              
10 The pressure for correction came mainly from within the Government and the Central Bank.  Among 
top advisers, only this author argued for a controlled relaxation.  In the event, the relaxation proved 
greater than desirable, partly because of the impact of the presidential election in December 1990 on 
wages.  This forced the authorities to tighten monetary policy sharply at the end of 1990 and the 
beginning of 1991, which in turn may have accentuated somewhat the recessionary impact of the CMEA 
collapse in the first half of 1991.  The IMF was not consulted about these policy changes. 
11 Poland breached the criteria already for June 1991.  The negotiations of new criteria for the second half 
of 1991 and 1992 were not successful.  However, the financial assistance by the World Bank was not 
halted.  Moreover, Poland did not need IMF’s money during those two years.  The IMF’s tough stand in 
1991 enhanced its credibility and helped to negotiate and implement sensible policies for 1993. Stanisław Gomułka 
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reduction of the official debt if it ran a successful Fund-supported program in 1993.  
Reaching an implementable agreement with the Fund therefore became essential.  This 
was made easier by the more flexible position displayed by the IMF in 1992.  Influenced 
probably by the course of events in Hungary and elsewhere in Eastern and Central 
Europe, the IMF increased its tolerance level for the budget deficit and the inflation rate.  
Moreover, to ease the deficit problem, the organization offered to support the Polish case 
for an import surcharge.  However, a package of strong fiscal measures, amounting to 
about 5% of GDP of new tax revenues and expenditure cuts, was proposed by Polish 
authorities, not the IMF.  The package reflected the outcome of an internal policy debate 
within the government and the country about the potential net costs and risks associated 
with a large budget deficit12.  To increase the chance of success, the program for 1993 
was based on conservative fiscal assumptions (Republic of Poland, 1992).  Its success 
was also aided by an economic recovery that was stronger than assumed.  In the event, all 
performance criteria were met comfortably and in a manner that should help the progress 
of recovery and stabilization in the post-program years. 
4.  The Polish Stand-by for 1994-95: A Macroeconomic Success but 
  a Structural failure? 
  The fourth Polish/IMF agreement was an 18-month program, to run from July 
1994 until December 1995 (Republic of Poland, 1994). It was also linked to a debt-
reduction agreement, but this time with private banks represented by the London Club.  
To implement it, on 27 October 1994, Poland needed $1.9 billion, of which $0.9 billion 
was provided by the IMF and $0.4 billion by the World Bank. 
  The program itself was innovative in that it placed strong emphasis on several 
structural and systemic reforms. Two such reforms were considered particularly 
important: implementation of the long-delayed mass privatization program for 444 large 
enterprises and a politically-sensitive change of the pension indexation rule, by linking 
periodic adjustments to a consumer price index rather than wage developments.  Positive 
government decisions on both reforms were given the status of "specific benchmarks 
against which progress in implementing the stand-by arrangement would be assessed at 
the time of the first review" (Republic of Poland, 1994). 
  Although the Polish Government accepted the arrangement, the implementation of 
the two politically-sensitive reforms was held up in 199413.  This put the credibility of 
                                              
12 A first draft of the package was written by this author in August 1992.  The package was then, with 
some modifications, adopted by the Board of the Finance Ministry and incorporated into the Budget for 
1993.  It was approved by the Government in December 1992 and the Parliament in February 1993. The 
critical role in pushing through the package was played by Jerzy Osiatynski, the Finance Minister.  For 
details of the package consult Republic of Poland 1992 or Gomulka 1994a. 
13 The mass privatisation reform became politically sensitive once it assumed a leading role for foreign 
management groups.  That role was proposed already in 1990 (Frydman and Rapaczynski 1990), and The IMF-Supported Programs... 
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both the Government’s ’Strategy for Poland’ and the IMF’s qualitative conditions to the 
test.  In the event, the non-compliance with these conditions on time was overlooked, the 
IMF falling back once again on the usual five quantitative criteria, which were all met in 
1994, and on public assurances by the government that the two reforms would eventually 
be implemented. 
5.  The Russian experience: a macroeconomic failure but a 
 transformation  success? 
  There has been much confusion about what kind of strategy Russia has followed 
and much discussion about policies that the country should follow, less shock and more 
therapy or more shock and more therapy.  Was the strategy excessively gradual?  With 
respect to macroeconomic policies, why have they been so inflationary?  Were they 
irrational? 
  From the perspective of the student of systemic transformation, there is much 
evidence in favor of the view that Russia in its own chaotic manner has followed a very 
radical reform, as documented in IMF (1994d).  The main components of that reform 
have apparently been implemented.  A fast liberalization of most prices, at least at the 
federal level, has permitted the replacement of central planning by market co-ordination.  
The liberalization of the foreign exchange market and internal convertibility of the ruble 
improved the mobility of resources and the quality of prices.  A considerable foreign 
trade liberalization has led to large shifts in the geographical and product composition of 
trade.  The size of the initially overblown defense sector has been much reduced.  A large 
progress in privatization and other systemic, structural and institutional changes have also 
taken place.  A deep fall in industrial output, by some 50 per cent, may be taken as 
indirect evidence of the substantial volume of painful reforms having been implemented, 
although a longer and deeper recession than in Poland is also related to a much smaller 
private sector at the start of transition (Goldman, 1994).  Moreover, the floating exchange 
rate policy led to an extremely deep real devaluation, and this in turn has produced a 
fairly strong improvement in the external position of the country. 
  Russia’s reforms have been gradual, elusive and controversial mainly with respect 
to inflation (Hernandez-Cata, 1994).  The country’s inflation crisis has been due almost 
entirely to the monetization of large budget deficits and even larger subsidized credits to 
enterprises (Easterly and Cunha, 1993).  In this respect, the sharp differences in public 
spending between Poland and Russia in 1992 are worth noting: much higher spending in 
Russia on defence, 6% versus 2%; producer and import subsidies, 10% versus 1.5%; 
subsidies to the former republics of the FSU, 5% versus 0%; but much lower spending on 
                                                                                                                                                  
accepted by the Polish Parliament in 1993 subject to modifications.  It was possible for the Prime 
Minister to delay the implementation of the reform on, effectively, national security grounds. Stanisław Gomułka 
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social transfers, particularly pensions, 8% versus 20%14. The large subsidies to 
enterprises have also slowed down the pace of restructuring.  It is clear that the 
authorities in Russia, and most of the FSU, have retained the main pre-reform concerns: 
production by enterprises, foreign policy and defense, while Polish authorities have 
developed concerns, arguably excessive, about consumption by individuals, particularly 
pensioners. 
  The distinctive feature of the Gaidar stabilization plan was that neither the wage 
rate nor the exchange rate would serve as a nominal anchor15. This feature caused 
concern for the IMF already by the end of 1991.  However, a strict monetary policy 
probably could have controlled nominal wage increases.  Real wages fell sharply in 1992, 
as required by the stabilization objectives.  The problem was the failure of the 
government to eliminate the need for the domestic bank financing of the budget deficit of 
6% of GDP in 1992 (IMF 1993, Table 5) and an excessive flow of much-subsidized 
credit to enterprises and former republics of the FSU by the authorities.   
  The first Fund-supported program for Russia, of June 1992, was of a Standby 
type16.  It expired on January 4 1993.  During that period, the inflation rate was supposed 
to decline to below 5% a month.  Instead, it increased from about 10% a month in the 
second quarter of 1992 to about 25% a month in the fourth quarter of 1992, and remained 
at that high level for much of 1993.  In terms of this particular indicator of performance, 
so central for the IMF, the program was a failure17. The second program was of the STF 
type.  It started in June 1993 and is still continuing.   Again, the chief aim of the program 
in 1993, reducing the monthly rate of inflation to single digit levels by the end of 1993, 
was missed.  However, in 1994, Russia is showing an unexpected determination to bring 
the rate of inflation down. 
V.  Foreign assistance in a broader perspective 
  In his address to the Group of Thirty at its Spring 1993 planning meeting in 
Vienna, Mr. Klaus, the Prime Minister of the Czech Republic, summarized his 
                                              
14 The estimates of subsidies and social transfers in Russia are highly imprecise, but hopefully indicate 
the orders of magnitude involved. 
15 The original document which Gaidar presented to President Yeltzin in early November 1991, and on 
the basis of which he was appointed to lead the Russian reform effort, had stabilisation plan in its title.  
However, the body of the document was concerned mainly with liberalisation, privatisation and 
institutional reforms, and not at all with detailed stabilisation policies. 
16 Russia formally re-joined the BWI’s also in June 1992. 
17 Russia applied to G-24 for a $6 billion stabilisation fund already in December 1991.  The Fund was 
potentially available in the years 1991-94, but it was not activated because "the appropriate conditions 
were not in place" (IMF, 1994e p.78). The IMF-Supported Programs... 
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experiences as a reformer in the form of Ten Commandments for what he calls profound, 
fundamental, structural reforms.  One of the Commandments asserts that the role of 
foreign aid in these reforms is marginal18.  This also happens to be my view with respect 
to most transition countries of the region.  The reason is self-evident.  Using purchasing 
power parities, per capita GDP in the FSU and Central Europe was, just before the 
reforms, some US$ 5,000 and, therefore, the total GDP of all the transition countries was 
about 2000 billion US dollars.  The average fall of measured GDP during the contraction 
phase of transition has been about 40%, or $800 billion in flow terms.  Even if the actual 
fall was much smaller, say $400 billion, the investment needed to restructure the region’s 
capital stock sufficiently so that, at least, the pre-reform level of GDP is regained must be 
several times the lost output, that is, some $1000 billion.  The combined resources of 
international financial institutions are clearly too small by comparison to make a sizeable 
contribution to such an investment effort.  The resources can, in any case, be provided 
only on a commercial basis, rather than as a development aid, and therefore subject to 
strict conditions that transition economies cannot easily meet.  In the initial period of 
transition, there is, in addition, a low capacity to use large foreign capital effectively. 
  The argument above flies against the widespread perception of the large role that 
foreign assistance does or should play.  That perception may be based in part on a fairly 
large actual role of the international financial institutions, particularly the IMF, in 
providing the expertise and policy guidance for economic stabilisation and institutional 
development, and on confusion concerning the motivations guiding the cooperation 
between transition countries and multi-national institutions.  An extreme view could be 
held, and it has been expressed at times, that the West has been attempting to impose 
specific reforms and policies that reflect its own values and interests rather than the needs 
of the reforming countries.  Consequently, vast Western assistance has been provided, or 
should be offered, to transition countries as an incentive, or, indeed, as a form of 
compensation, to encourage the countries to adopt the capitalist system and specific 
policies.  One of the reasons for the reluctance of Western governments to offer sizeable 
foreign assistance to transition countries may have been the concern not to lend credence 
to such a view. 
  Some economists have based their arguments in favor of foreign assistance on the 
apparent bankcrupcy of the state in transition countries, one dangerous for international 
security, a drastic downgrading of the size of transition economies, and on a 
correspondingly vast exaggeration of the potential economic impact of such assistance 
(Sachs 1993, 1994.  For a different view see Dabrowski, 1995).  Extreme devaluations of 
local currencies have, for some periods, reduced wages in most transition economies to 
some 20 US dollars a month, and the region’s GDP to about $200 billion.  By this 
account, Russia’s GDP in 1992 was a mere $100 billion, or about the size of West 
                                              
18 The IMF and the G-7 group were using quite effectively the method of ill-specified promises of 
substantial aid.  The promises were costless for the western taxpayers, but often served to help local 
references in persuading the governments and the parliaments concerned to adopt reforms. Stanisław Gomułka 
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German annual assistance to the former GDR.  It would therefore appear possible to 
stabilise the Russian economy by providing a relatively small external aid, some $10 
billion a year, to the government budget and the enterprise sector.  However, such a 
stabilization plan would soon fail, as the inevitable rapid appreciation of the exchange 
rate, following stabilization, would reduce quickly the ruble value of the aid, opening up 
the budget deficit gap again. 
VI. Concluding  remarks 
  The impact of foreign assistance can be substantial, even vital, only on a few 
occasions, especially when it is in the form of grants and debt reductions linked to 
performance.  Most post-communist economies are simply too large and their transition 
to capitalism too costly for foreign assistance to have more than a marginal impact.   
Some of these economies are already heavily indebted, and this gives them little room for 
contracting new debt.  A far more important foreign impact may come from the inflow of 
Western private investment and know-how.  However, internal reform efforts rather than 
external financial assistance are needed for this inflow to take place. 
  International financial organisations, especially the BWIs, have been helpful for 
Russia and Poland by providing local reformers with modern analysis and expert policy 
advice.   They were also most helpful in pressing Western creditors for a sizeable debt 
reduction of the Polish debt and a fast removal of trade barriers to West European 
markets.  However, the sequence of reforms, their content and the speed of transition 
have been decided largely by the initial circumstances, the new long-term goals of the 
countries concerned and the various internal political and institutional factors during 
transition, rather than by the advice of the two institutions.  
  The major problem in the design of IMF programs for both countries has been the 
nearly-exclusive choice of standard, purely macroeconomic and stabilization-related 
performance criteria.  The key transformation reforms were recognised from the start, in 
the Polish program for 1990, as central for the success of long-term economic strategy, 
including the achievement of macroeconomic stability,  but while these reforms were 
discussed with officials and incorporated in the program documents, they were not 
covered by formal performance criteria.  This paper suggests that this was probably a 
mistake. 
  However, in the later IMF-supported programs, the initially strong emphasis on 
rapid stabilization has been reduced, and progress with structural reforms has been given 
more weight in the evaluation of performance.  The difference between Poland and 
Russia has been mainly in the conduct of macroeconomic policy and not in the core of 
transformation reforms.  Errors in forecasting, analysis and policies have been made, 
some of them quite major, but, in the crisis circumstances of the two countries, the main 
body of reforms, especially in Poland, has probably been about right. The IMF-Supported Programs... 
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